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Hanming Fang, PhD

The Affordable Care Act (ACA), or Obamacare, has had a transformational
effect on the individual market for health insurance in the United States and
specifically for people with pre-existing health conditions.
Over 12 million people signed up for 2016 insurance coverage on one of the new exchanges created
by the law. And along with an expansion of Medicaid
eligibility that 31 states have adopted1—another key
element of the ACA—over 22 million Americans have
acquired health insurance since 2013. But the program
has failed to meet many of its enrollment targets, and
the combination of narrow networks2 and higher than
anticipated premiums have made it difficult for some
people to realize the benefits of their coverage, particularly when paired with high deductibles. Others
remain financially burdened by the requirement to
purchase minimum coverage in the individual marketplace, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority
of those insured through exchanges received federal aid
in the form of insurance subsidies.3 Republicans have
been attempting to undo the law, either in whole or in
part, essentially since its inception, citing the ACA’s
high costs and lack of “universal access”—a common
party term, not to be confused with the Democrats’
health insurance goal of “universal coverage.”
After numerous repeal attempts (and one veto)
during the Obama Administration’s tenure, both the
Senate and House passed budget resolutions in early

SUMMARY
• This Issue Brief uses a new economic model to empirically
examine the pivotal mechanisms of the Affordable Care Act,
such as the individual mandate, employer mandate, and premium subsidies, to inform the current debate over repealing
and replacing the ACA.
• Simulations based on the model suggest that the ACA, if left
intact, in the long run significantly reduces the uninsured rate
among workers in the estimation sample to below 4 percent.
• Interestingly, the simulations also suggest that the employer
mandate is not a crucial pillar for the success of the ACA. In
an ACA scenario without that mandate, the uninsured rate
would be only slightly higher than the uninsured rate under
the full ACA.
• The analysis indicates it is the premium subsidy, rather than
the employer mandate or the individual mandate, that is crucial
for the success of the ACA, in terms of expanded coverage.
• The brief concludes with a look at the key elements of the main
legislative proposals Congressional Republicans have offered
to replace the ACA, including the American Health Care Act.
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January to draft repeal bills for the
ACA through the budget reconciliation process. Through this process,
Republicans have the power to eliminate and replace any provision of the
ACA that costs the federal government money, like premium subsidies,
without requiring any Democratic
votes. To achieve a complete overhaul
of the ACA, however, several Democrats would have to support a new,
comprehensive law, which is unlikely
for a variety of reasons that are beyond
the scope of this Issue Brief. Republican legislators nevertheless are now
debating the merits of several detailed
replacement plans that have been
introduced within the last two years.
Some of these plans may increase
the number of people who receive
insurance, which is a frequently stated
goal of President Donald Trump,
despite its being at odds with established Republican policy priorities.4
Other policymakers have crafted
proposals that significantly scale back
aspects of the current law, such as the
Medicaid expansion or the creation
of insurance exchanges. The recently
released House Republican budget
reconciliation, titled the American
Health Care Act (AHCA), retains
some of the most popular features of
Obamacare as it still allows young

adults to stay on their parents’ plans
until they reach age 26, and prohibits
insurance companies from denying
coverage to individuals with pre-existing health conditions. But it completely repeals the employer mandate
of the ACA. The individual mandate
of the ACA is also repealed; instead, it
incentivizes young and healthy individuals to buy insurance with a continuous coverage requirement in order
to avoid being charged a premium
penalty (see Table 1). It also replaces
the income based premium tax credit
under the ACA with an age/income
based refundable tax credit. Significantly, it will change Medicaid into
a block grant program starting from
2020. Notably, the insurance exchange
and the essential benefit requirements
for qualified insurance plans, two ACA
features, remain as key components of
the AHCA. As expected, the new act
has stirred significant opposition both
from the Democrats and conservative
Republicans, for very different reasons.
This Issue Brief uses new research
on the labor and health insurance
market dynamics of the ACA to
empirically dissect the pivotal mechanisms of Obamacare and identify
their effects, thus shedding some
much-needed light on the repealand-replace debate. It also provides a

model to examine what health insurance coverage in the U.S. could look
like in the long run (i.e., after the
markets have a chance to settle into
a new steady state in response to the
provisions of the ACA) in the absence
of repeal. Understanding the effects
of specific elements of the ACA, such
as the individual mandate and premium subsidies, is crucial to predicting the effects of any policy that seeks
to replace all or part of the current
system. This Issue Brief illustrates
in summary-level detail the impact
of these ACA elements, including
some of the often-neglected benefits
of expanded coverage, especially to
employers, which policymakers should
consider in all of their upcoming
debates over costs and the streamlining of operations.

providers-than-the-average-for-comm.
Robert Pear, “86 Percent of Health Law Enrollees Receive
Subsidies, White House Says,” New York Times, March
10, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/us/117-million-americans-have-insurance-under-health-act.
html?_r=0.
4 Robert Costa and Amy Goldstein, “Trump Vows ‘Insurance for Everybody’ in Obamacare Replacement
Plan,” Washington Post , January 15, 2017, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-vows-insurance-for-everybody-in-obamacare-replacement-

plan/2017/01/15/5f2b1e18-db5d-11e6-ad42-f3375f271c9c_story.html?utm_term=.f53544ba4a26.
5 This model and the subsequent results come from a working paper by Naoki Aizawa and Hanming Fang entitled
“Equilibrium Labor Market Search and Health Insurance
Reform” (Second Version, October 2015), http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/~hfang/WorkingPaper/healthreform/
Aizawa-Fang-October14-2015.pdf. This research is
only a first step toward understanding the mechanisms
through which the ACA, and more generally any health
insurance reform, may influence labor markets equilib-

MODELING OBAMACARE: THE
LABOR MARKET AND THE
UNINSURED
There is a brand new model that
integrates both the labor and health
insurance markets in order to both
qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the impacts of the key components
of the ACA, including the individual
mandate, the employer mandate, the
insurance exchanges, and the income-

NOTES
“Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions,”
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, January 1, 2017,
http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-themedicaid-expansion-decision/. Notably, Vice President
Mike Pence, formerly the Governor of Indiana, was one of
ten Republican governors to expand Medicaid coverage in
their respective states.
2 “Exchange Plans Include 34 Percent Fewer Providers
than the Average for Commercial Plans,” Avalere, July
15, 2015, http://avalere.com/expertise/managed-care/
insights/exchange-plans-include-34-percent-fewer1
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based insurance premium subsidies, as
well as various combinations of these
ACA components.5 This model offers
robust insights into the mechanisms
through which Obamacare affects
the labor market in a state of equilibrium, where risk averse workers
facing potentially significant medical
expenditures are matched with firms
making health insurance coverage
decisions. The predictions generated by
this model are largely consistent with
the dynamics of workers’ labor market
experience, health, health insurance,
and medical expenditure, as well as the
distributions of employer sizes
and wages that are observable in the
real data.6
This labor market search model,
as it is called, is a departure from its
predecessors because it incorporates
considerations of health and health
insurance in the decisions of workers
and firms.7 A model like this one is
necessary for understanding the general equilibrium implications of health
insurance reform, and it is deeply
influenced both by previous research
and the greater contextual landscape
of American health care. Specifically,
the United States is unique among
industrialized nations in that it lacks
a national health insurance system
and most of the nation’s working-age

population obtains health insurance
coverage through their employers.8
Fortunately, there already exists an
abundance of research showing the
well-documented connections between
firm sizes, wages, health insurance
offerings, and worker
turnovers upon which a model like
this depends in order to be numerically estimated.
For example, it is well known that
firms that do not offer health insurance are more likely to be small firms,
to offer low wages, and to experience
higher rates of worker turnover. In
the data used in the paper, the average
firm size was about 8.8 for employers
that did not offer health insurance, in
contrast to an average size of 33.9 for
employers that did offer health insurance; the average annual wage was
$20,560 for workers at firms that did
not offer health insurance, in contrast
to an average wage of $29,077 at
firms that did; and the annual separation rate of workers at firms that did
not offer health insurance was 17.3
percent, while it was 15.8 percent at
firms that did.9 Moreover, workers in
firms that offer health insurance are
more likely to self-report better health
than those in firms that do not offer
health insurance. The estimated model
is capable of replicating all the above

empirical patterns in the US labor
market prior to the implementation of
the ACA.

Economic Review 39 (1998): 257-273. The parameters
of the model are estimated using data from Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP, 1996 Panel),
available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/
sipp/data.1996.html; Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS, 1997-1999), available at https://meps.ahrq.
gov/mepsweb/; and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Employer Health Insurance Survey (RWJ-EHI,1997),
available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/HMCA/
studies/2935.
7 The model is based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998); C.

Bontemps, J.M. Robin, and G. Van den Berg, “An Empirical
Equilibrium Search Model with Continuously Distributed
Heterogeneity of Workers’ Opportunity Costs of Employment and Firms’ Productivities, and Search on the Job,”
International Economic Review 40 (1999): 1039-1074; C.
Bontemps, J.M. Robin, and G. Van den Berg, “Equilibrium
Search with Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory
and Nonparametric Estimation,” International Economic
Review 41 (2000): 305-358. One of the most desirable
features of the model is that it has a coherent notion of
firm size, which allows for the satisfactory examination

OVERALL EFFECTS OF
THE ACA
With all of this background knowledge serving as a foundation, the
model shows that the first interesting
and important effect of the ACA is
that it lessens the degree of adverse
selection for less productive firms
(which are more likely to be small
firms). This levels the playing field for
the low- and high-productivity firms
to offer health insurance in terms of
the adverse selection problem.10 The
adverse selection problem decreases
over time because of the positive effect
of health insurance—now available
through regulated exchanges with
subsidized premiums—on employee
health. However, this result (i.e.,
improved health status of the workforce) is captured to a greater extent
by high-productivity firms relative
to low-productivity firms, due to
a “retention effect.” The retention
effect simply refers to the fact that
high-productivity firms tend to offer
higher wages and retain workers
longer.11 These various effects collectively generate a positive relationship

NOTES
rium. It was estimated using a selected sample of male
and female individuals with relatively homogeneous skills
(with no more than high school graduation, and with ages
between 26-46), and thus the quantitative findings may
only be valid for this population. Furthermore, though all
effects cited here are judged to be robust qualitatively, the
quantitative magnitudes remain subject to change after
additional experimentation.
6 The steady state equilibrium of the model is characterized
in the spirit of K. Burdett and D. Mortensen, “Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment,” International
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between wage, health insurance, and
firm size. They also explain why the
health status of employees covered by
employer-sponsored insurance plans
(ESIs) is better than that of uninsured
employees in the data. In fact, due to
these effects, the incentives for firms,
even the more productive ones, to
offer health insurance is only slightly
reduced in a hypothetical scenario
where the tax exclusion of ESI premiums is eliminated.
The second important effect of the
ACA is that, due to the availability
of subsidized health insurance from
the exchange, it significantly reduces
workers’ willingness to pay for ESI.
Since a worker now has an option
to buy health insurance from the
exchanges, possibly with a federal subsidy if his/her income is low, he/she
is less willing to work for a firm that
offers ESI but with low pay. Also, the
firms’ benefits in terms of increased
productivity from offering ESI are also
significantly reduced under the ACA,
and importantly, the reduction is much
more pronounced for the low-productivity (and typically smaller) firms.
This acts as a countervailing force that
lowers the incentives of small firms to
offer ESI.
In light of the current policy
debates, the model can be used to

examine the impact of the aforementioned four key components of the
ACA. Simulations based on the model
predict that, left intact, the ACA
would in the long run significantly
reduce the uninsured rate among the
workers in the estimation sample
from 22.34 percent in the pre-ACA
benchmark economy to about 3.67
percent or 3.93 percent, depending
on whether the expanded Medicaid
rolls are included in the risk pool of
health insurance exchanges.12 This
large reduction of the uninsured rate
is mainly driven by the unemployed
(5.13 percent of the population)
receiving Medicaid coverage due to its
expansion and around 17 percent of
employed workers with relatively low
wages participating in the insurance
exchanges with their premiums supported by the income-based subsidies.
The net reduction of the uninsured
rate is smaller than the sum of 5.13
percent and 17 percent because the
ESI offering rate for firms with less
than 50 workers would decrease from
55.40 percent in the benchmark to
46.05 percent under the ACA, which
we further discuss below.

THE EMPLOYER MANDATE
EFFECT
Due to the employer mandate, should
it ever be implemented, the health
insurance offering rate for firms with
50 or more workers would increase
from 92.03 percent in the benchmark
to 98.67 percent under the ACA;
however, the health insurance offering
rate for firms with less than 50 workers would decrease from 55.40 percent
in the benchmark to 46.05 percent
under the ACA. Again, the reason for
the reduction in small firms’ ESI offering rate is that the ACA reduces the
value of ESI for workers, particularly
those with low income, because of the
availability of premium-subsidized
health insurance from the regulated
health insurance exchanges. The sizedependent employer mandate would
lead to a slight increase in the fraction
of firms with less than 50 workers,
with a small but noticeable clustering of firms with size just below the
employer mandate threshold of 50.
Overall, there would be a small reduction in the fraction of employed workers receiving ESI, from 82.17 percent
in the benchmark to 79.15 percent
under the ACA.
Interestingly, under an ACA
scenario without the employer man-

NOTES
of the effect of the size-dependent employer mandate as
stipulated in the ACA.
8 According to the Kaiser Family Foundation and Health
Research and Educational Trust (2009), more than 60
percent of the non-elderly population in the U.S. received
their health insurance sponsored by their employers,
and about 10 percent of workers’ total compensation
was in the form of ESI premiums. Full survey available at https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013/04/7936.pdf.
9 Based primarily on the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foun-

dation Employer Health Insurance Survey.
In this case, adverse selection refers to the likelihood that
less healthy job candidates will seek work at a disproportionately higher rate than healthy workers, unbeknownst
to employers, and that their poor health will be a burden
to their new firms (i.e., lost productivity and higher cost of
providing insurance).
11 A high-productivity firm offering health insurance can
poach workers from a much wider range of firms, including a larger fraction of workers who work in firms that
already offer insurance and are thus healthier; in contrast,
10

4

a low-productivity firm offering health insurance can only
poach workers from firms with even lower productivity,
many of which do not offer health insurance and thus have
less healthy workers.
12 Recall that the sample used in the analysis of this paper
is males and females between ages 26-46 with no more
than a high school graduation. Their uninsured rate, at
22.34 percent, is higher than that of the overall population
(which stood around 16 percent in that period).
13 The individual mandate requires everyone in the U.S. to
have health insurance that meets the law’s minimum
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date, the uninsured rate would be 4.63
percent, just slightly higher than the
uninsured rate under the full ACA.
Without the employer mandate on
firms with 50 or more workers, small
firms increase their ESI offering rate,
and individuals without ESI also
have stronger incentives to purchase
insurance from the exchange. The
simulations suggest that the employer
mandate, surprisingly, is not a crucial
pillar for the success of Obamacare.

an adverse selection problem so severe
as to render them non-functioning.
Obamacare without premium subsidies
would only lead to a small reduction
of the uninsured rate to 18.19 percent
from the 22.34 percent in the benchmark. These results suggest that the
premium subsidy is the key pillar for
the success of Obamacare.

THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
AND PREMIUM SUBSIDY
EFFECTS

A final simulation covers the effects
of eliminating the tax exclusion
for ESI premiums both under the
benchmark and under the ACA. The
elimination of the tax exclusion for
ESI premiums would reduce, but not
eliminate, the incentives of firms,
especially the larger ones, to offer
health insurance to their workers, and
the overall effect on the uninsured rate
is modest. The uninsured rate would
increase from 22.34 percent to 35.10
percent when the ESI tax exclusion is
removed in the benchmark economy,
and it would increase from 3.67 percent to 6.05 percent under the ACA.
Prohibiting firms from offering ESI
in the post-ACA environment would
lead to a large increase in the uninsured rate, which suggests that ESI
complements, rather than hinders, the

The uninsured rate in a simulation
of the ACA without the individual
mandate would be 7.34 percent, significantly lower than the 22.34 percent
under the benchmark.13 And with neither the individual nor the employer
mandate, the uninsured rate would be
9.22 percent. The premium subsidy
component of the ACA would have
drawn all of the unemployed (regardless of their health) and the low-wage
employed (again regardless of their
health) into the insurance exchange by
itself. In fact, if the premium subsidies,
instead of the individual mandate,
were removed from the ACA, the
insurance exchanges would suffer from

THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR ESI
PREMIUMS EFFECT

NOTES
standards or else face a penalty when filing taxes for the
year. Currently, the penalty is 2.5 percent of income or
$695, whichever amount is greater. The original motivations for this mandate included compelling younger and
healthier people to join insurance pools to bring down
premium costs for everyone, as well as the fact that
people without insurance who become seriously sick or
catastrophically injured impose enormous costs for taxpayers. Accordingly, it remains one of the most politically
divisive elements of Obamacare.
14 Jonathan Gruber, “The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Spon-

sored Health Insurance”, NBER Working Paper 15766,
http://www.nber.org/bah/2010no1/w15766.html.
15 “Obamacare Repeal and Replace: Policy Brief and Resources,” available at http://bit.ly/2IQ3TLd.
16 The age band is the allowable range of price discrimination based on age. Under the ACA, older people can be
charged premiums that are up to three times higher than
those offered to younger people. The Republican proposals seek either to raise this cap from three to five times or
to eliminate it entirely.
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smooth operations of the health insurance exchanges.
This is the reality of insurance
coverage under the ACA. If the goal,
as President Trump seems to believe, is
to insure everyone, then it is essential
to understand the potential and the
inner-workings of the program that
will be replaced, so as to learn from its
limitations. In that case, this model
is highly instructive. If, however, the
goal is mere cost reduction, then it still
behooves policymakers to fully understand the benefits of expanded health
insurance coverage, as neither side of
the economic coin should be debated
in isolation. The next section sheds
more light on these benefits.

THE SOLIDIFYING SHAPE OF
REPEAL AND REPLACEMENT
There appear to be several points of
consensus among Republicans over
potential reform measures. These
include: the elimination of the explicit
individual mandate; the elimination
of the ACA’s essential health benefits package, which is a regulation
that requires insurers to provide ten
universal benefits in each exchange
plan; the elimination of the yet-to-beimplemented employer mandate; and
the ability to purchase exchange plans

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

TABLE 1:

DIFFERENCES IN REPUBLICAN LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

“Continuous Coverage” Requirement Implicit Individual Mandate

HHS Secretary Tom Price:
Empowering Patients
First Act (2015)

Senate Finance Comm. Chair
Orrin Hatch:
Patient CARE Act (2015)

Included (18 Months of
Coverage Required Prior
to Enrollment)

Included (18 Months of
Coverage Required Prior
to Enrollment)

Cost of Not Maintaining
Up to 1.5x Higher
No Limits on Premium
“Continuous Coverage”Premiums for 2 Years
Increases or Coverage Denial
Allowable Price Discrimination			
by Health Status			
New Age Band Limit (3x at present) No Limit
Allowable Price Discrimination by Age		
Cap on Tax Exclusions for EmployerSponsored Plans

$8,000 for Individuals;
$20,000 for Families

across state lines. All of these measures would require new legislation
and require (at least some) bipartisan
approval. But there also has been significant disagreement among Republicans over other aspects of what a
potential ACA replacement would
look like. Five noteworthy proposals
have thus far been introduced as legislation or for open debate, and their
primary differences are represented in
Table 1.
With such broad Republican
support for eliminating the ACA’s
individual mandate, it is interesting
that four of these proposals include
a more subtle mandate for younger
and healthier individuals to purchase
coverage. Though the details differ, a
common element across proposals is
the idea of a “continuous coverage”
requirement, which typically would
incentivize a person seeking to purchase insurance on an exchange to
have maintained some type of minimum health coverage for a specific
period of time (e.g., 63 days in the
American Health Care Act) in order
to avoid significantly higher premi-

Senator Ted Cruz:
House Speaker Paul Ryan:
Health Care Choice Act
“A Better Way” (2016)
(2015)		

None (Repeals All ACA
Included (Unspecified
Included (No More Than 63 Continuous
Changes to the
Amount of Time Required
Days of Lapsation in the 12
Individual Market)		
Months Prior to Enrollment)
No Limits on Premium
Unspecified
Increases or		
Coverage Denial

Premiums Up to 5x Higher
No Limit
for Older Americans		
Included (Unspecified)

None

ums or even outright coverage denial
if they have a pre-existing condition (PEC). A continuous coverage
requirement, therefore, is a policy that
can protect consumers against insurance companies denying or charging
them much higher premiums for coverage because of PECs if they have no
lapses in coverage. This may play the
role of the ACA individual mandate,
albeit implicitly, to acquire coverage
out of concern for their future selves,
who may become seriously sick or
injured. In other words, the requirement uses an individual’s risk aversion
toward potential higher future premiums against them to incentivize them
to obtain coverage now, when they are
still healthy. Given this policy option,
it may be useful for future research to
consider the role and effects of the
current individual mandate, and to
model and analyze how a continuous coverage requirement policy, with
specific parameters such as the length
of the look-back period for continuous coverage requirement and the
permissible premium hike if continuous coverage is not maintained, may
6

The American Health Care Act
(2017)

30% Premium Surcharge
for 1 Year

Premiums Up to 5x Higher
for Older Americans

Premiums Up to 5x Higher
for Older Americans

Included (Unspecified)

None

resemble or differ from this pillar of
the ACA. In particular, it remains
an open question whether AHCA’s
12-month look-back period and 30%
premium hike irrespective of the
enrollee’s health risk provide sufficiently strong incentives for the young
and the healthy to buy insurance. In
addition, continuous coverage requirement works only if consumers are
sufficiently forward looking, and demonstrate adequate financial and health
literacy. Thus, extensive information
campaign and consumer educational
outreach will be crucial. Moreover,
there also needs to a new borrowing
mechanism so that credit-constrained
consumers who experience temporary
liquidity shocks can continue paying
their health insurance premiums.
A second key point of disagreement among these legislative proposals involves a potential cap on the tax
exclusion for ESIs. After spending on
Medicare (roughly $400 billion) and
Medicaid (roughly $300 billion), the
current tax exclusion for ESIs (roughly
$260 billion) is the country’s largest
public (tax) expenditure on health

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
care.14 A cap would be designed to
incentivize workers to select plans
that offer fewer benefits and include
more cost-sharing, which economists
generally endorse because cost-sharing
helps to reduce unnecessary health
care spending, which in turn could
drive down costs throughout the entire
system. Since employers are always
vying for the best workers, they benefit
from offering health insurance purely
from a competitiveness standpoint.
Currently, there is no penalty for
offering candidates the most generous plans on the market. Employers,
however, may view a cap as a large tax
increase, particularly if they deem the
ability to offer these generous plans (or
Cadillac Plans, using Obamacare parlance) as a necessary means of attracting top talent. However, the findings
discussed earlier suggest that the effect
of the magnitude of the tax exclusion
cap for ESI premiums on the uninsured rate is likely to be moderate.
Aside from these various legislative proposals, a recent white paper
from House leadership, which was
prepared for the five House and Senate Committees responsible for health
care oversight, highlights critical
replacement steps that can be enacted
through the budget reconciliation
process alone.15 One of these steps
has a clear Obamacare analogue: the
policy proposal of offsetting the cost
of insurance from new exchanges with
tax credits. (For a list of other noteworthy steps recommended by House
leadership, see Table 2. A detailed
discussion of the merits and shortcomings of these features is beyond
the scope of this Issue Brief.) Under
the ACA, most people who receive
coverage in the federal marketplace or
from state exchanges receive subsidies

TABLE 2:

ACA REPLACEMENT VIA BUDGET RECONCILIATION

Age-Based Tax Credits: The New Premium Subsidies
Increased Limits for Tax-Free Health Savings Accounts
Medicaid Reform (including Repeal of the ACA’s Expansion)
“State Innovation Grants” (i.e., High Risk Pools)
Elimination of Several Health Care Industry Taxes
Source: Obamacare Repeal and Replace: Policy Brief and Resources,” available at http://bit.ly/2IQ3TLd.

based on their income. The current proposal favors the idea of cost
assistance based on age instead. This is
perhaps because other reform proposals, such as increases in the age band16
or the elimination of essential benefits
at the discretion of insurers, likely
would raise the cost of insurance for
older people, who may need the sort
of comprehensive plans that younger
and healthier people may no longer
be compelled to buy. But regardless of motivation, there again may
be wisdom in studying the role and
effects of the current income subsidies
and how they may predict the effects
of age-based tax credits, even with the
knowledge that these proposed credits
are notably less generous than the
Obamacare subsidies.

CONCLUSION
Despite the enormous and time-sensitive political pressure on Congressional
Republicans to produce replacement
legislation for Obamacare, any pivotal
new element of health care reform
would benefit (prior to implementation) from the type of quantitative and
qualitative analysis now accessible for
the ACA. Left intact, the ACA would
significantly reduce the uninsured
rate among U.S. workers from 22.34
percent in the pre-ACA economy to
7

about 3.67-3.93 percent in the long
run. Under a scenario in which the
employer mandate is never implemented, the uninsured rate would be
only slightly higher, at 4.63 percent.
Without the individual mandate, the
uninsured rate would be 7.34 percent.
And without either mandate, the uninsured rate would be 9.22 percent.
If premium subsidies, instead
of the individual mandate, were
removed from the ACA, the insurance exchanges would suffer from an
adverse selection problem so severe
that the exchanges would cease to
function. Obamacare without premium subsidies would only lead to a
small reduction of the uninsured rate
to 18.19 percent. The uninsured rate
would increase from 22.34 percent to
35.10 percent if the ESI tax exclusion were removed in the benchmark
economy, and it would increase from
3.67 percent to 6.05 percent under the
ACA. Obamacare is not without serious flaws, including narrow networks
and many instances of high premiums
paired with high deductibles. Policymakers honestly debating repeal-andreplacement proposals, however, would
do well to consider both the costs and
benefits of the current system—and to
model new policies before implementing them.

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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